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INTRODUCTION
It is well-established that arbitration clauses in seafarers’ employment 
contracts are enforceable if the seafarer is not a U.S. citizen. This rule 
stands even if the foreign seafarer’s claims might be governed by the Jones
Act1 or general maritime law about unseaworthiness or maintenance and
cure, or if there is some doubt over whether the arbitral tribunal will apply 
U.S. law to the seafarer’s claims.2 The same is true of arbitration clauses
Copyright 2020, by MARTIN DAVIES.
* Admiralty Law Institute Professor of Maritime Law, Tulane University 
Law School; Director, Tulane Maritime Law Center. This Essay is based on a
presentation given by the auth**or at the 16th Judge Alvin B. Rubin Conference 
on Maritime Personal Injury Law at the LSU Law Center on April 13, 2018.
1. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012).
2. Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(Filipino seaman); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (Filipino seamen, claim under Fair Labor Standards Act); Bautista v.
Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (Filipino seamen); Balen v. Holland
Am. Line, Inc., 583 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2009) (Filipino seaman, Seamen’s Wage
Act claim); Razo v. Nordic Empress Shipping Ltd., 362 F. App’x 243 (3d Cir. 
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404 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
within American seafarers’ employment contracts if the contract calls for 
“performance abroad,”3 which has been held to include both “blue-water”
(that is, oceangoing) service in foreign ports and foreign waters,4 as well
as any work done traveling to or from a foreign country.5 Any action 
brought in a United States court by a seafarer in these circumstances must
be stayed pending arbitration6 by operation of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York 
Convention).7 Seafarers’ employment contracts are “considered as 
commercial”8 for purposes of the legislation implementing the New York 
Convention,9 which mandates a stay of proceedings unless the court finds 
the arbitration agreement to be “null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed.”10 
These well-established principles govern only if the New York 
Convention applies to the arbitration agreement that the defendant seeks
to enforce when sued by a seafarer plaintiff. Article II(1) of the New York
Convention provides that Contracting States—including the United
States—must recognize an “agreement in writing” for arbitration of
disputes, and article II(2) provides that: “The term ‘agreement in writing’
2009) (Filipino seaman); Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 
2012) (Nicaraguan seaman); Navarette v. Silversea Cruises, 620 F. App’x 793 
(11th Cir. 2015) (Filipino seaman); Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 
805 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2015) (Honduran seaman).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
4. Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Serv. Inc., 379 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2004)
(American seaman working in Nigerian territorial waters); Johnson v. NCL 
(Bahamas) Ltd., 163 F. Supp. 3d 338 (E.D. La. 2016) (American seaman working 
on ship visiting various Caribbean ports).
5. Alberts v. Royal Caribbean Ltd., 834 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2016)
(American musician injured on cruise ship traveling to foreign ports).
6. Actions brought in federal court are stayed under 9 U.S.C. § 3, which 
applies to Chapter 2 by operation of 9 U.S.C. § 208, and orders compelling
arbitration are made under 9 U.S.C. § 206. Actions brought in state court may be
removed to federal court under 9 U.S.C. § 205 and then stayed by the federal court.
See, e.g., Johnson v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 163 F. Supp. 3d 338 (E.D. La. 2016).
7. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter “New York Convention”]. The United States ratified the New York
Convention on September 30, 1970; the Convention is given the force of law in 
U.S. courts by 9 U.S.C. § 201, “in accordance with this chapter.”
8. 9 U.S.C. § 202.
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08.
10. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. II(3).
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4052020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement,
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.” 
In Sphere Drake Insurance PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc.,11 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted article II(2) of the
New York Convention as follows:
We would outline the Convention definition of ‘agreement in
writing’ to include either:
(1) an arbitral clause in a contract or
(2) an arbitration agreement,
(a) signed by the parties or
(b) contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
The insurance contract indisputably contains an arbitral clause.
Because what is at issue here is an arbitral clause in a contract, the 
qualifications applicable to arbitration agreements do not apply. A
signature is therefore not required . . . The district court properly 
did not require that the contract containing an arbitral provision be 
signed to constitute an agreement in writing under the 
Convention.12 
This interpretation of article II(2) is at odds with that preferred by the
Second, Third, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.13 It is also at odds with the
grammatical structure of the English language version of article II(2) and
the French and Spanish texts of the New York Convention, which are
“equally authentic” to the English text.14 In short, the Sphere Drake
interpretation of article II(2) seems to be plainly incorrect; nevertheless, it 
remains good law in the Fifth Circuit. A proper interpretation of
article II(2) would hold that the New York Convention does require 
signature of a contract containing a clause providing for arbitration of 
disputes that may arise in the future—a clause compromissoire—just as
much as it requires signature of an arbitration agreement entered into after 
a dispute has arisen—a compromis. This Essay explains why that is so and
explores the implications for actions brought by seafarers in the Fifth 
Circuit, where Sphere Drake is still binding. Those implications may be 
far-reaching for seafarers wishing to bring court proceedings,
notwithstanding the presence of an arbitration clause in their employment
contracts. 
11. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, 16 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994).
12. Id. at 669.
13. Infra notes 19, 24, 25, 26.
14. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. XVI(1).
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406 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Part I describes the textual basis for the interpretation preferred by the 
other circuits. Part II explains the significance of that interpretation in
seafarers’ personal injury cases by describing the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC.15 Part III shows that the
interpretation adopted in the other Circuits is consistent with previous
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit authority about binding non-signatories
to arbitration agreements, despite first appearances. Part IV considers 
whether a district court in the Fifth Circuit could adopt the interpretation 
used in the other Circuits while nevertheless remaining true to the 
authority of Sphere Drake. Part V illustrates why it is important to
determine whether that possibility remains open by considering cases
involving borrowed servants, crewing agencies, and guest workers.
I. A OR (B IF C)? OR (A IF C) OR (B IF C)?
Article II(2) of the New York Convention takes the form “A or B, if 
C,” where A is “an arbitral clause in a contract,” B is “an arbitration 
agreement,” and C is “signed by the parties or contained in an exchange
of letters or telegrams.” So far as the grammatical structure of article II(2)
is concerned, the question is whether C qualifies both A and B, or whether
it qualifies only B. The rule of statutory construction known as the
Doctrine of the Last Antecedent states that a qualifying word or phrase
qualifies only the term that appears immediately before it16 unless the 
qualifying word or phrase is separated from the preceding terms by a
comma, in which case it qualifies all that appears before the comma.17 In 
other words, the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent says that “A or B if C”
15. 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).
16. See, e.g., Quindlen v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 482 F.2d 876, 878 (5th 
Cir. 1973); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1086 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Zacarias, 260 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 2001).
17. Sobranes Recovery Pool I, LLC v. Todd & Hughes Const. Corp., 509
F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen there is a serial list followed by modifying
language that is set off from the last item in the list by a comma, this suggests that
the modification applies to the whole list and not only the last item.”); see also
Stepnowski v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 456 F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[W]here there is a comma before a modifying phrase, that phrase modifies all 
of the items in a series and not just the immediately preceding item.”); Finisar
Corp. v. DirecTVGrp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Am. Int’l Grp.,
Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 712 F.3d 775, 781–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (“When there is
no comma . . . the subsequent modifier is ordinarily understood to apply only to
its last antecedent . . . . When a comma is included . . . the modifier is generally
understood to apply to the entire series.”); Davis v. Devanlay Retail Grp., Inc., 
785 F.3d 359, 364 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015).
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4072020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
means “A or (B if C),” but the comma exception means that “A or B, if C”
means “(A if C) or (B if C).”
Thus, the ordinary rules of English grammar suggest that the words 
“signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams,”
(C) in the language of article II(2) of the New York Convention, apply to 
both “an arbitral clause in a contract” (A) and “an arbitration agreement”
(B). That interpretation is supported by reference to the French and 
Spanish texts of article II(2),18 which read as follows:
On entend par ‘convention écrite’ une clause compromissoire
insérée dans un contrat, ou un compromis, signés par les parties 
ou contenus dans un échange de lettres ou de télégrammes.
La expresión ‘acuerdo por escrito’ denotará una cláusula
compromisoria incluída en un contrato o un compromiso,
firmados por las partes o contenidos en un canje de cartas o 
telegramas.
The adjectives “signés,” “contenus,” “firmados,” and “contenidos” are all
in the plural form, indicating that they apply to more than one thing,
namely both items appearing in the list before the comma. If the French
and Spanish equivalents of “signed by the parties or contained in an 
exchange of letters or telegrams” (C) were to apply only to “an arbitration
agreement” (B)—“un compromis” or “un compromiso”—they would be 
in the singular form, “signé par les parties ou contenu dans un échange de 
lettres ou de télégrammes” and “firmado por las partes o contenido en un
canje de cartas o telegramas,” respectively.
This analysis of the grammatical structure of the English version of
article II(2) and of the “equally authentic” French and Spanish texts led 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to conclude, in 
Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark International Ltd.,19 that the words
“signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams”
apply both to “an arbitral clause in a contract”—a clause
compromissoire—and to “an arbitration agreement”—a compromis. Thus,
where purchase orders containing arbitration provisions were signed only 
by the New York-based buyer in Kahn Lucas and not also by the Hong 
Kong-based seller’s agent, the arbitral clauses did not constitute an 
18. The English text is quoted above in the Introduction: “The term ‘agreement
in writing’ shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement,
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”
19. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir.
1999).
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408 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
“agreement in writing” for purposes of article II(2) of the New York 
Convention.20 As a result, the seller’s agent was not obliged to arbitrate a
claim brought by the buyer in court in the United States, notwithstanding 
the arbitration provisions in the purchase orders.21 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Kahn Lucas that article II(2) should
be interpreted as “(A if C) or (B if C)” is directly contrary to the Fifth 
Circuit’s Sphere Drake interpretation that article II(2) should be
interpreted to mean “A or (B if C),” that is, that the signature requirement
applies only to an agreement in writing—a compromis (B)—and not also 
to an arbitral clause in a contract—a clause compromissoire (A).22 The 
Kahn Lucas court explicitly rejected the Sphere Drake interpretation,
stating:
[T]he rules governing our construction do not allow us to follow
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of article II, section 2 as 
expressed in Sphere Drake.Upon review of the Convention’s text,
punctuation and subject matter, as well as an examination of the
Convention’s legislative history, we hold that the modifying 
phrase “signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters 
or telegrams” applies to both “an arbitral clause in a contract” and
“an arbitration agreement.”23 
20. Id. at 218–19.
21. The Hong Kong-based seller’s agent moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction when the New York-based buyer sued in district court in the
United States. Id. at 213. The district court held that it did not have personal
jurisdiction over the seller’s agent, but it would have personal jurisdiction if the 
buyer sought to compel arbitration of the pending claims. Id. The final decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was that there was
no personal jurisdiction over the seller’s agent because it was not bound by the
arbitration provisions in the purchase orders, so the buyer could not move to 
compel arbitration. Id. at 219.
22. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, 16 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994).
23. Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 218.
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4092020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
The Third,24 Ninth,25 and Eleventh26 Circuits have subsequently followed 
the Kahn Lucas interpretation, specifically preferring it to the Fifth 
Circuit’s alternative Sphere Drake interpretation.27 
Thus, both the weight of authority and general principles of statutory 
and treaty construction strongly suggest the Sphere Drake interpretation 
of article II(2) is incorrect as a matter of principle. One of the more recent
of the conflicting circuit court decisions, Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, 
LLC,28 illustrates the significance of that conclusion for court proceedings
brought by injured seafarers who appear to have agreed to arbitrate their 
claims.
II. YANG V. MAJESTIC BLUE FISHERIES, LLC
Chang Cheol Yang was a seaman employed on a fishing vessel,
Majestic Blue, which was owned by Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC 
(“Majestic Blue”), a U.S. company.29 Yang’s employment contract with 
Majestic Blue provided for arbitration of all disputes in the country of the
seafarer’s nationality, which in Yang’s case was South Korea.30 A South
Korean company, Dongwon Industries Co. Ltd. (“Dongwon”), had agreed
with Majestic Blue that Dongwon would supply the ship’s crew— 
including Yang—and would remain responsible for maintenance and
repairs of the ship.31 Dongwon had previously ownedMajestic Blue, but it 
had recently sold the vessel to Majestic Blue for $10.32 
Yang died, rather heroically, whenMajestic Blue sank in unexplained 
circumstances in fair weather.33 Yang’s widow sued Dongwon and 
24. Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots OY, 333 F.3d 440 (3d Cir. 2003).
25. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).
26. Czarina, LLC v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004);
Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 
2018).
27. Standard Bent Glass, 333 F.3d at 449 (“We agree with the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.”); Yang, 876 F.3d at 1000 (“We are persuaded by
Kahn Lucas’s faithful adherence to the principles of treaty interpretation.”). 
28. Yang, 876 F.3d 996.
29. Id. at 998.
30. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, No. 13-00015, 2015 WL 5001190,
at *3–4 (D. Guam 2015).
31. Yang, 876 F.3d at 998.
32. Id.
33. The crew of Majestic Blue abandoned ship when the ship began to
founder, leaving the master, Captain Hill, alone on the ship trying to execute
critical abandon ship procedures on his own. Id. Yang returned to the sinking ship 
in an attempt to save Captain Hill, but both died when the ship sank. Id.
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410 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Majestic Blue in the United States District Court for the District of Guam,
claiming damages for: (1) pre-death pain and suffering in a Jones Act
survival action; (2) wrongful death under general maritime law;
(3) wrongful death under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA);34 and 
(4) wrongful death under the Jones Act.35 Dongwon and Majestic Blue
moved to compel arbitration under the New York Convention, relying on 
the arbitration clause in Yang’s employment contract.36 The United States
District Court for the District of Guam stayed the proceedings that Yang’s 
widow brought against Majestic Blue, following binding Ninth Circuit
authority for the proposition stated at the beginning of this Essay, namely
that a claim that a foreign seafarer brings against his or her employer in a
United States court must be stayed if there is an arbitration provision in the
seafarer’s employment contract.37 The district court refused, however, to
stay the proceedings against Dongwon, holding that it was not party to the
employment contract containing the arbitration agreement; thus, it was not
entitled to a stay or an order compelling arbitration of the claims against it.38 
Dongwon appealed unsuccessfully to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Dongwon could not compel
arbitration under the New York Convention.39 Dongwon was not a party
to the contract containing the arbitral clause and had not signed that
contract, nor was the contract contained in “an exchange of letters or
telegrams” between Yang and Dongwon.40 Thus, Dongwon was not party 
to “an agreement in writing” for arbitration of claims against it for 
purposes of the New York Convention.41 The court preferred the Kahn
Lucas interpretation of article II(2) to the Sphere Drake interpretation,
holding that it was not sufficient for purposes of article II(2) that there was 
a contract containing an arbitral clause—the Yang/Majestic Blue
contract—if the party seeking to rely on that clause, namely Dongwon,
had not signed that contract.42 Dongwon was not one of the parties to the
signed contract containing the arbitration clause, so it could not rely on it.
34. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–308 (2012).
35. Yang, 876 F.3d at 998.
36. Id.
37. Balen v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 583 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2009).
38. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 13-00015, WL 5001190, at *3–4 
(D. Guam 2015). 
39. Yang, 876 F.3d 996. Yang’s widow did not cross-appeal the district 
court’s decision staying her action against Majestic Blue.
40. Id. at 999, 1001.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 999–1000.
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4112020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
If the facts of Yang had led to litigation in the Fifth Circuit, the result 
might well have been different.43 According to the Sphere Drake
interpretation of article II(2) of the New York Convention, it would have 
been immaterial that Dongwon did not sign the Yang/Majestic Blue
employment contract containing the arbitral clause because “the
qualifications applicable to arbitration agreements do not apply” to 
arbitral clauses in contracts, and so “[a] signature is therefore not 
required.”44 The question in front of the Fifth Circuit would then have been 
whether Dongwon was entitled to rely on the Yang/Majestic Blue 
employment contract as a third-party beneficiary. As Part III of this Essay
demonstrates, there is Fifth Circuit authority to the effect that contract and
agency principles of state law govern whether an arbitration agreement
applies to a non-signatory.45 This authority repeats the Sphere Drake
proposition that “an arbitration clause in a contract provides an ‘agreement
in writing’ that satisfies the Convention, even when the party that is forced 
to arbitrate has not signed the contract.”46 In stark contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Yang stated a bright-line rule that a non-signatory
cannot rely on an arbitration clause in a contract to compel arbitration of 
court proceedings brought against it under the New York Convention.
III. BINDING NON-SIGNATORIES TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In In re Talbott Big Foot, Inc.47 and Zimmerman v. International
Companies & Consulting, Inc.,48 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that an arbitration clause in an insurance contract did 
not bind an injured worker bringing suit against the insurer under
43. In Dahiya v. Talmidge Int’l Ltd., 371 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth
Circuit employed a Sphere Drake analysis to conclude that an injured Indian 
seafarer should be compelled to arbitrate all claims that he had brought in relation 
to his injuries, including claims against parties who had not signed the
employment contract to which he was party. The majority of the court did not find 
it necessary to consider the question of the enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement, disposing of the appeal on the ground that it was subject to the
statutory bar in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which precludes appellate review of orders
remanding cases to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
44. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1994).
45. Todd v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Bermuda) Ltd., 601 F.3d
329 (5th Cir. 2010).
46. Id. at 334, n.11.
47. 887 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1989).
48. 107 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1997).
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412 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Louisiana’s direct action statute49 because the worker was not a party to 
the agreement containing the arbitration clause. In Todd v. Steamship
Mutual Underwriting Ass’n (Bermuda) Ltd.,50 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. Carlisle51 overruled Big Foot and Zimmerman.
Carlisle held that non-signatories to arbitration agreements, such as direct-
action plaintiffs, may be compelled to arbitrate if the applicable principles 
of state contract law so provide.52 
At first look, cases such as Kahn Lucas and Yang may appear to be
inconsistent with Carlisle in their insistence that only the signatories to a
written arbitration agreement may enforce the obligation to arbitrate under 
the New York Convention. That is not so. Carlisle was concerned with a
stay under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which is Chapter One of
Title 9 of the United States Code.53 The Carlisle Court said:
Respondents argue that, as a matter of federal law, claims to
arbitration by nonparties are not “referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing,” 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added), because
they “seek to bind a signatory to an arbitral obligation beyond that 
signatory’s strictly contractual obligation to arbitrate” . . . .
Perhaps that would be true if § 3 mandated stays only for disputes
between parties to a written arbitration agreement. But that is not
what the statute says. It says that stays are required if the claims
are “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.” If a
written arbitration provision is made enforceable against (or for 
the benefit of) a third party under state contract law, the statute’s 
terms are fulfilled.54 
In contrast, article II(3) of the New York Convention does only mandate
stays for disputes between the parties to a written arbitration agreement. It
provides:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the 
meaning of this article [that is, an “agreement in writing”] shall, at
49. Then LA. REV. STAT. § 22:655 (1989), now LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:1269 (2011).
50. Todd, 601 F.3d at 329.
51. 556 U.S. 624 (2009).
52. Id. at 630–31.
53. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
54. Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 631. 
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4132020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration . . . . 55 
It is clear from the words of article II(3) that only the parties to the 
agreement in writing are entitled to request the court to refer their dispute
to arbitration. As the Yang Court pointed out, each chapter of Title Nine
imposes unique requirements on a party seeking to compel arbitration.56 
The requirements under Chapter Two, which deal with the New York
Convention, are different from the requirements under Chapter One,
which the Carlisle Court considered. Indeed, the basic premise of the cases
enforcing arbitration clauses in “international” seafarers’ employment
contracts57 is that they are “commercial contracts” falling within Chapter
Two, rather than ordinary contracts falling within Chapter One, which 
specifically provides that it does not apply to seafarers’ employment 
contracts.58 To be consistent with that basic premise, courts should look 
only to the requirements of Chapter Two when considering whether to stay
court actions brought by seafarers. The circuit courts of appeals that have 
followed Kahn Lucas59 have effectively held that the rules governing
binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements are different under the 
New York Convention than those that apply under Chapter One of Title
Nine, with the result that no non-signatory may move to compel
arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
recently reaffirmed that proposition in unequivocal terms in Outokumpu 
Stainless U.S.A., LLC v. Converteam SAS,60 holding that: “Private parties
. . . cannot contract around the Convention’s requirement that the 
parties actually sign an agreement to arbitrate their disputes in order to 
compel arbitration.”61 
Carlisle held that nothing in the federal law created by Chapter One 
of Title Nine purported to alter “background principles of state contract
law regarding the scope of agreements (including the question of who is
bound by them).”62 In contrast, the New York Convention is the “supreme 
Law of the Land” in those cases to which it applies by virtue of the
55. New York Convention, supra note 7, art. II(3).
56. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2017).
57. For contracts involving foreign seafarers or American seafarers
“perform[ing] abroad,” see supra text accompanying notes 2, 4.
58. 9 U.S.C. § 1 provides, in pertinent part: “[N]othing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
59. Supra notes 24–26.
60. 902 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2018).
61. Id. at 1326.
62. Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009).
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414 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,63 which means that it
precludes application of state law.64 Thus, there is no room for application 
of “background principles of state contract law” that conflict with the
specific requirements of the New York Convention about who may enforce
an arbitral agreement.65 The Yang court made this quite clear when it stated:
While the FAA permits arbitration where an arbitration agreement
is enforceable under state law, the Convention Act requires a
litigant to satisfy additional prerequisites established by the 
Convention Treaty. One such prerequisite is that the litigant prove
the agreement is in writing and “signed by the parties.” Another is
that the dispute at issue be one between the “parties.” To the extent
the FAA provides for arbitration of disputes with non-signatories or
non-parties, it conflicts with the Convention Treaty and therefore
does not apply. Accordingly, cases interpreting the FAA as
allowing a non-signatory or non-party to compel arbitration where
an arbitration agreement is enforceable under state law offer no
guidance in interpreting the Convention Act’s requirement that an
agreement in writing be signed by the parties.66 
Only the Fifth Circuit takes the opposite view, which clearly seems to be 
incorrect. Could a district court in the Fifth Circuit follow Yang,
notwithstanding the authority of Sphere Drake? That is the question
considered in the next Part.
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
64. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383–84 
(2015) (“It is apparent that this Clause creates a rule of decision: Courts . . . must 
not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws.”).
65. But see Todd v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Bermuda) Ltd., No. 
08-1195, 2011 WL 1226464 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011). On remand, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana applied Louisiana state law to 
determinewhether a third-party non-signatory was bound by an arbitration agreement.
The court’s choice-of-law inquiry was questionable, to say the least, because it
included the application of renvoi to the parties’ contractual choice of English law.
The court’s application of renvoi meant that the court considered the English choice
of law rules, which referred back to Louisiana law. Id. at *5. That approach was
unorthodox because it is generally accepted that there is no renvoi in contract cases,
and that a contractual choice of governing law is a choice of the local law of the
relevant jurisdiction, excluding that jurisdiction’s choice of law rules. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
66. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2017)
(internal citations omitted).
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4152020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
IV. WHAT IS A DISTRICT COURT IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT TO DO?
The Fifth Circuit has never questioned the authority of Sphere Drake
in the quarter century since it was decided. No panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit can now overrule it.67 District courts
in the Fifth Circuit are obliged to follow it, regardless of any compelling 
arguments for a different interpretation of article II(2) of the New York
Convention. It may be possible, however, to confine the decision 
narrowly, so as to allow court proceedings to continue in situations such
as those faced by the Yang court.
In Sphere Drake, the owner of the ship St. Jude insured it with an 
English insurer, but the ship sank and four members of its crew died before 
the policy was delivered to the shipowner.68 The policy contained a clause 
requiring arbitration of all coverage disputes in London, but the shipowner 
and several other related plaintiffs brought suit against the insurer in state 
court in Louisiana, seeking a declaration that the insurance policy covered 
the loss of St. Jude and the death of the four crew members.69 The court
eventually stayed the litigation because of the presence of the arbitration 
clause, despite the fact that the insured shipowner had not yet signed the 
contract.70 Thus, the decision is authority for the proposition that a party 
to a written contract containing an arbitration clause must arbitrate any 
claim based on that contract, whether or not the contract is signed by both
67. United States v. Albert, 675 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1982); Alexander v.
Chevron, U.S.A., 806 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1987) (“in this circuit one panel
may not overrule the holding of a previous panel”); Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n
v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 510 (5th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases). There is no basis
in statute or any of the federal rules for the interpanel doctrine that only an en 
banc court (or the Supreme Court) can overrule a panel decision; it is simply a
practice adopted by all federal circuit courts of appeals, including the Fifth
Circuit. See Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential Force of Panel Law, 76 MARQ.
L. REV. 755 (1993).
68. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., No. 92-2058, 1992 WL
404345, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 1992).
69. Id.
70. The district court held, in the alternative, that the agreement was
“contained in an exchange of letters or telexes” for purposes of article II(2) 
because the insurer had initialed and stamped a slip presented by the shipowner’s
broker, which offered to be bound by the terms of the insurer’s standard policy.
See id. at *5. Oddly, no mention of this finding was made by the appeals court, 
which proceeded on the basis that the owner was claiming on an unsigned 
insurance contract containing an arbitration clause. The district court’s alternative 
finding would have obviated any need for the circuit court to make its 
controversial interpretation of article II(2).
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416 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
parties. The case did not directly deal with the situation in which a party
to a written contract containing an arbitration clause, signed or not, sues 
or is sued by a non-signatory third party. As a result, a district court in the 
Fifth Circuit could find it possible to confine the authority of Sphere Drake
to the two-party situation with which it dealt, namely that of an unsigned
contract containing an arbitration clause. A willing district court could
faithfully follow the Sphere Drake interpretation of article II(2) of the New 
York Convention while also holding that a non-signatory third party is not
entitled to request the court to compel arbitration because of the words of 
article II(3). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yang shows that no 
non-signatory third party may enforce arbitration under the New York
Convention, a situation that simply was not considered by the Fifth Circuit
in Sphere Drake. That situation is, nevertheless, one that frequently arises 
in maritime employment contracts, as the next Part shows.
V. BORROWED SERVANTS, CREWING AGENCIES, AND GUEST WORKERS
It is quite common for seafarers working on a vessel to be employed
by someone other than the vessel’s owner or operator. For example, the 
seafarer may be a “borrowed servant” working on a vessel operated by
someone other than his or her contractual employer.71 This may be the 
result of a relatively informal labor-sharing arrangement,72 or it may be the
result of the seafarer’s employment contract being with a crewing agency
that has contracted to provide a crew to the vessel operator.73 On cruise
71. See, e.g., Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Serv. Inc., 379 F.3d 327 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
72. See, e.g., Ogden v. GlobalSantaFe Offshore Services, 31 F. Supp. 3d 832 
(E.D. La. 2014) (seafarer paid by one company but working for another); 
Daughtry v. Jenny G. L.L.C., 703 F. App’x 883 (11th Cir. 2017) (same); Yang v. 
Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).
73. See, e.g., Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 224–25 (5th Cir.
1975) (crew employed by labor agency that contracted with vessel operator),
overruled in part on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 
F.3d 331, 339 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Sablic v. Armada Shipping A.P.S., 973 
F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Tx. 1997) (seafarer contracted with Croatian crewing agency, 
which contracted to provide crew for Panamanian-owned, Danish-operated ship).
See also Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Serv. Inc., 379 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(worker’s services provided by employer to another pursuant to “Offshore 
Personnel Supply Agreement”). Crewing agencies do not always contract as 
principal employer in this way; they often act only as intermediaries, finding the 
crew who then directly contract the ship operator. See, e.g., Calix-Chacon v.
Global Int’l Marine, Inc., 493 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2007) (seafarer hired by U.S. 
company through services of Honduran crewing agency).
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4172020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
lines and other passenger ships, it is not uncommon for workers to
contribute to the mission of the vessel as a whole—and thus to be seafarers 
in relation to that vessel—but be employed by a concessionaire, such as a 
spa operator.74 If the seafarer’s employment contract contains an
arbitration clause, but the seafarer sues the ship operator rather than his or
her direct employer, the court must squarely face the New York
Convention issues outlined in this Essay if the seafarer is foreign, or if he
or she is an American working “abroad.”75 
For example, in Freudensprung v. Offshore Technical Services Inc.,76 
the plaintiff seafarer contracted with Offshore Technical Services, Inc. 
(“OTSI”) but was injured while working off the coast of Nigeria on a barge
operated by Wilbros West Africa, Inc. (“WWAI”).77 The plaintiff sued 
both OTSI and WWAI in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.78 OTSI moved successfully for a stay of the proceedings
against it, relying on an arbitration clause in the plaintiff’s employment
contract.79 Although both OTSI and the plaintiff were American citizens,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the New 
York Convention applied; thus, a stay was mandated because the
plaintiff’s performance of the contract occurred “abroad.”80 The plaintiff’s 
action against WWAI was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction.81 
WWAI was a Panamanian corporation that did not have sufficient 
minimum contacts with Texas, where the action was brought.82 If,
however, WWAI had been subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction, a 
74. See, e.g., Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352
(S.D. Fla. 2017) (operator of cruise ship held not entitled to enforce arbitration 
provision in employment contract between spa operator and its employee).
75. Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002); Lim
v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2005); Bautista v.
Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005); Balen v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 
583 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2009); Razo v. Nordic Empress Shipping Ltd., 362 F.
App’x 243 (3d Cir. 2009); Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th 
Cir. 2012); Navarette v. Silversea Cruises, 620 F. App’x 793 (11th Cir. 2015);
Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2015);
Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Serv. Inc., 379 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Johnson v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 163 F. Supp. 3d 338 (E.D. La. 2016); Alberts v. 
Royal Caribbean Ltd., 834 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2016).
76. Freudensprung, 379 F.3d 327.
77. Id. at 332.
78. Id. at 333.
79. Id. at 347.
80. Id. at 341.
81. Id. at 333.
82. Id. at 344–45.
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418 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
question virtually identical to that in Yang would have arisen: could 
WWAI, a non-signatory third party, seek a stay of proceedings relying on 
the arbitration agreement in the contract between the plaintiff and OTSI?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would 
answer that question in the negative, as it did in Yang.83 It seems likely 
that courts in the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits would also 
answer no because WWAI did not itself sign the contract containing the 
arbitration clause and so was not a party to an “agreement in writing” for 
purposes of article II(2) of the New York Convention.84 A district court in 
the Fifth Circuit would not be forced by Sphere Drake to answer in the
affirmative because Sphere Drake says nothing about the situation where
a third party seeks to rely on an “agreement in writing” under the New 
York Convention. Such a district court might choose to look to state law
principles to determine whether WWAI could rely on the contract as a
non-signatory,85 but a proper reading of the New York Convention should 
lead it to conclude that only the parties who signed the written arbitration 
agreement can compel arbitration under article II(3).
CONCLUSION
In international commercial arbitration, for which the New York 
Convention was designed, the narrowness of the definition of “agreement
in writing” in article II(2) is now regarded as a serious shortcoming 
because it is obviously ill-suited to a 21st century climate of informal 
electronic communication, smart contracts, and other ways in which the 
conduct of international business has changed since the treaty was made
in 1958. In 2006, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) counseled against strict interpretation of article II(2)
in a document entitled “Recommendation regarding the interpretation of 
article II, paragraph 2, and article VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done in
New York, 10 June 1958.”86 In that document, UNCITRAL recommended
83. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).
84. Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots OY, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 
2003); Czarina, LLC v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Yang, 876 F.3d at 1000; see also Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 286 F.
Supp. 3d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
85. See, e.g., Todd v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Bermuda) Ltd.,
601 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2010).
86. United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Recommendation 
Regarding the Interpretation of Article II(2) and Article VII(1) of the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED
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4192020] ARBITRATION CLAUSES
that the interpretation of the writing requirement in article II(2) 
“recogniz[e] that the circumstances described therein are not
exhaustive.”87 The UNCITRAL Secretariat’s “Guide on the Convention 
on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,” published
in 2016,88 states that since the 2006 Recommendation, national courts have
been more willing to apply the less stringent formal requirements available 
under their national laws, which article VII(1) suggests may be possible.89 
The nature of the arguments for a broader interpretation based on article 
VII(1) of the New York Convention lie beyond the scope of this Essay. 
For present purposes, it suffices to say that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Yang showed no interest in arguments
based on UNCITRAL’s pronouncements about article II(2), pointing out
that: 
[T]he Convention Treaty was not drafted by the United Nations 
commission that issued the 2006 recommendation, and its
recommendation has never been implemented by Congress . . . . 
While we have occasionally interpreted an ambiguous treaty term
in light of the signatory nations’ post-ratification understanding,
the 2006 recommendation is nothing like the kind of evidence we 
have found persuasive.90 
In short, recommendations from international bodies like UNCITRAL 
about how article II should be interpreted cannot carry a court beyond the 
words of the provision itself, which are, as pointed out above, “the
supreme Law of the Land” in the United States.91 The anachronistic
formula in article II(2) will almost certainly never be amended by 
Protocol, since the New York Convention is, in a sense, a victim of its own
success. At the time of writing,92 161 countries were parties to the New 
York Convention,93 far too large a number to be likely to agree 
NATIONS (adopted July 7, 2006), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files
/media-documents/uncitral/en/a2e.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HZN-PKAP].
87. Id. at Recommendation 1. 
88. United Nations Comm’n on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL
Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITEDNATIONS https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/NY-conv/2016_Guide_on_the_Convention.pdf [https://perma.
cc/A753-8TP9] (last visited January 18, 2020).
89. Id. at p. 51, ¶ 37.
90. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2017).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.
92. November 2019.
93. New York Convention, supra note 7.
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420 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
unanimously to any proposed amendment to the words of the original 1958 
text. Any proposed change to those words would most probably be 
accepted by some, but not all, Contracting States. This would mean that
any amending Protocol would destroy the uniformity that is such an
important part of the international success of the New York Convention.
There being no move to amend the words of the New York Convention,
the task of courts in the United States is simply to interpret the words that 
have appeared in the treaty since 1958. Inconvenient though that may be 
in disputes that are genuinely concerned with international commerce, it
may provide a lifeline for seafarers attempting to make an “end run”
around the provisions of the New York Convention in cases that U.S.
courts have declared to be commercial and unprotected by the FAA’s 
exclusion of seafarer’s employment contracts from the effectiveness of
arbitration agreements.94 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yang shows that
the “end run” is clearly available outside of the Fifth Circuit, particularly
in cases involving non-signatories.95 This Essay has attempted to show that
the “end run” may be available in the Fifth Circuit, too, notwithstanding 
the awkward authority of Sphere Drake. If no district court in the Fifth 
Circuit can be persuaded to countenance such an “end run,” it can be
expected that injured seafarers who have agreed to arbitration in their
employment contracts may seek to bring court proceedings elsewhere in
the United States—perhaps anywhere other than the Fifth Circuit, given
the existing state of authority.
94. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
95. See supra Part II.
